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Since the United Nations Development Decade of the 1960s, governments have agreed in the UN 
on a number of time bound quantitative goals to as guidelines and benchmarks to influence 
national and international action and development assistance. Contrary to much opinion, many of 
these goals have had a major influence on subsequent action and many have been largely or 
considerably achieved. This paper reviews this experience, summarises the wide range of goals 
adopted, underlines the need for a more nuanced and critical approach to what is meant by goal 
achievement and draws lessons for the process of pursuing the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and for the HDR 2003. 
 
Goals, in this paper, are taken to mean quantitative, time-bound objectives. Global goals are taken 
to cover all UN goals which were applied to a sizeable number of countries, mostly all 
developing countries or all developing countries within a particular region or groups of countries, 
like the least developed. The paper has seven parts and an annexe: 
 
1.  An overview of goals set by the UN  
2.  An overview of achievements 
3.  Approaches to implementation 
- The UN Development Decade 1961-1970 and three subsequent decades 
- WHO and smallpox eradication 1966-77  
- UNICEF and priority support for child goals in the 1980s and 1990s 
- Bretton Woods and structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s  
4.  Defining achievement. What makes for success? 
- The Water Decade, 1981-90 
- UNICEF and the Child Survival Revolution 1982-90 
5.   Costs of action towards achieving the goals  
6.    The pros and cons of setting global goals 
7.   Conclusions and questions still remaining 
 
The Annexe summarises the goals set by the UN, the date when first adopted, key 
elements, target dates and results, when available. It also provides references to the target 




                                                 
1 This paper has been prepared for the Human Development Report Office as an input for the Human 
Development Report 2003, which will focus on the Millennium Development Goals. I am grateful for 
comments and suggestions on an earlier draft from the HDRO team and from participants in the advisory 
committee for HDR 2003 as well as from Hans Singer, who drafted the “Blue Book” containing the details 
of the Development Decade, UN, The United Nations Development Decade (New York:UN, 1962) 
The annexe for this paper has been prepared by Merja Jutila, PhD candidate, The Graduate Center, 
The City University of New York, who has also helped to collect and check early UN material on goals and 
achievements. I gratefully acknowledge her help – while stressing that responsibility for any errors and for 
all interpretation is mine alone.  
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1. An overview of goals set by the UN
2  
 
From its earliest days, governments in the UN have reached agreement on a wide variety 
of global goals to give quantitative expression to objectives which they have felt 
important and to provide for their systematic implementation and monitoring of progress 
towards these objectives. Such goals have included:  
 
•  Ending of colonialism, a dominant political goal of the late 1940s to 1960s; 
•  Acceleration of economic growth in the developing countries supported by an 
increase in international assistance, the two major goals of the (First) UN 
Development Decade in the 1960s and central goals of the second, third and 
fourth development decades;  
•  Goals for economic growth of and special support for the Least Developed 
Countries set at the 1981 UNCTAD conference as part of the Substantial New 
Programme of Action for the 1980s for the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
and in the subsequent conferences on the LDCs in 1991 and 2001;  
•  Goals for the expansion of education 1960 to 1980, set regionally by a series of 
UNESCO regional conferences held between 1960 and 1962;  
•  Goals for the eradication of smallpox, malaria and other communicable diseases, 
set by WHO from the 1950s and 1960s; 
•  Goals for the expansion of immunization over the 1980s and 1990s set by WHO 
and UNICEF as a means to reduce child mortality and the incidence of measles, 
tetanus, pertussis, diphtheria and tuberculosis and for the eradication polio by 
2000; 
•  Goals for improving the situation of children and women  - ten major goals and 
seventeen supporting goals set at the World Summit for Children in 1990
3; 
•  Goals for the adoption and implementation by countries of various instruments of 
human rights, occasionally in the 1960s and 1970s but notably with respect to the 
adoption of CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women) and the CRC (Convention on the rights of the 
Child) in the 1980s and 1990s
4; 
•  The Millennium Development Goals adopted by heads of State at the Millennium 
Summit in 2000, for the halving of poverty by 2015 and the achievement of six 
other quantitative goals for reducing deprivation, two more general goals and one 
multi-dimensional goal for Partnership between developed and developing 
countries in the pursuit of all the goals over the years until 2015; 
                                                 
2 Achievements are summarized in section 2 of the paper and a full list of details and sources will be found 
in the Annexe table. 
3 There was some duplication among the 33 goals agreed at the World Summit and not all were quantified. 
Eliminating the duplication leads to the 27 goals referred to here and removing those which could not be 
quantified produces the 21 goals listed in the Annexe table.  
4 We have found it difficult to produce a simple quantification of progress made in ratifying and adopting 
these and other Human Rights Conventions. The Human Development Reports from 2000 onwards provide 
lists of the countries which have ratified the main Conventions and the total numbers which have done so.      4
 
Conventional wisdom and casual international hearsay has it that it is easy enough for 
governments to agree such goals and that in consequence, they have little meaning, have 
rarely been taken seriously and have seldom been achieved. The eradication of smallpox 
in 1977, eleven years after the goal was set, is sometimes quoted as the exception which 
proves the rule.  
 
A more careful review of the historical record proves otherwise. 
 
1.  Many of the goals have been most carefully constructed. They have usually been 
debated at length when first proposed - word by word, often syllable by syllable - 
in specific forums of the UN or in expert bodies, before being formally adopted in 
the responsible bodies of UN organizations or specialized agencies, usually 
confirmed in meetings of ECOSOC and the General Assembly. The proposal for 
the eradication of smallpox was first proposed in 1953, raised several times 
subsequently and only finally agreed in 1966.
5 It is true, that when finally agreed, 
most global goals have been adopted by consensus but even then on some 
occasions, a few countries, most often developed countries, have registered a 
specific qualification, but this is less frequent than is often suggested. The classic 
case is the United States, which, alone among the industrial countries, has 




2.  Though none of the goals have been achieved by the target date in all developing 
countries, several of the global goals have been achieved by developing countries 
as a group -for example, the economic growth target for the (first) Development 
Decade, the reduction of infant mortality to less than 120
7 by the year 2000 and 
the coverage of immunization within developing countries as a whole in 1990.  As 
the annexe makes clear, many of the goals have been achieved by a considerable 
number of developing countries and by the target date or soon after. An even 
larger number of countries have accelerated action in the area or sector concerned, 
compared with previous trends. A still larger number of countries often prepared 
national plans of action for the implementation of the goals, which has often 
helped to raise national awareness of the importance of the issues and provided a 
focus for advocacy and mobilization by NGOs and other civil society groups.  
 
3.  All this underlines the need for a more nuanced and disaggregated analysis of the 
impact of the global goals and, in particular, of the meaning of a “global goal 
being achieved or not being achieved.” Rather the emphasis should be shifted to 
the extent of implementation and success in the various ways in which goals have 
                                                 
5 See the most careful account in Frank Fenner et al. Smallpox and its eradication, History of International 
Public Health No 6, (Geneva:WHO, 1988)  
6 Most recently, in the US closing statement at the World Summit in Johannesburg 
7 Strictly this goal was for the poorest countries – though by definition, this had also achieved by 138 
developing countries -all but 12 developing countries, including the poorest - by the year 2000. See the 
Annexe table.    5
an influence. Gordon Conway of the Rockefeller Foundation has also suggested 
that the focus of monitoring should be shifted to the six or so critical actions, 
national or international, needed to ensure global progress towards each goal
8. 
 
4.  The reasons why particular countries have failed to achieve particular goals also 
require more careful analysis. In general, the countries, which have performed 
least well in terms of achieving many of the global goals, are among the group of 
least developed countries. Moreover, as the Human Development Report 1996 
showed, while it is possible to advance human development even in times when 
economic growth is low and even negative, sustained advance in human 
development seems to require economic growth over the longer term. This raises 
questions as to the extent to which failure to achieve global goals is the 
consequence of  
–  economic constraints or lack of political support within countries 
–  the total disruptions from civil and political conflict 
–  failures of international support for the goals 
–  world recession and wider difficulties and setbacks in the 
international economic environment, especially as these have 
affected poorer developing countries. 
Often, of course, failures to achieve goals in individual countries, or in a group of 
countries, are due to some combination of these factors, which in turn have been 
causes and consequences of the others, leading to a downward spiral of economic 
and social and political performance – and leading to the failure to achieve global 
goals and usually the failure of much else besides. 
 
5.  It is important to note that most if not all of the global goals have been set in UN 
bodies rather than in the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) or the WTO. Until 
recently, the BW bodies have generally opposed the concept of time-dated 
quantitative goals and often the goals themselves – the 0.7 per cent target for 
ODA for instance, or even more specific goals such as for educational expansion 
or the reduction of child mortality. In contrast, however, the BWI have been keen 
to negotiate with individual countries time dated, quantitative economic targets as 
part of the conditionalities of adjustment programmes. These targets have 
typically focused on such variables as the public sector deficit, the balance of 
payments and the inflation rate – each of which are, of course, means to 
improving economic performance rather than ends of development, let alone 
goals of human development. More serious, the single-minded focus of the BWI 
on economic variables has been driven by a narrow view of structural adjustment 
which in turn has led, especially in the 1980s, to policies and actions which often 
diverted attention from the social dimensions of adjustment, set back progress in 
the social sectors, and worked against the achievement of global goals in 
education, health and nutrition.   
 
                                                 
8 Gordon Conway, Policies and Jigsaws: achieving the Millennium Development Goals, address to the 
Senior Management Group of the UN, September 27
th, 2002. This is an important idea but one which I 
would suggest be used as an addition to direct year by year monitoring of progress to the goal itself.   6
 
 
All this underlines the need: 
 
1.  to define more clearly what is meant by goal achievement. 
2.  to review the record of the various goals and to analyse why or why not 
they have been achieved in the different senses identified as important. 
3.  to draw a broad range of lessons for future actions towards goal setting 
and goal achievement, including the need to build up a frame and flow of 
relevant statistics in each country to monitor progress, to guide corrective 
action and to mobilize political attention and action towards the major 
global goals.  
 
 
2 The record of achievement
9 
 
The annexe table provides a comprehensive overview of the various global goals adopted 
and the results achieved. The results are summarised here in terms of some broad 
categories of achievement: 1)goals largely achieved; 2)goals considerably achieved; 
3)goals partly achieved; 4)goals failed or almost totally failed.   
 
The first category includes goals which have been reached by developing countries as a 
group and which a large majority of relevant countries have individually achieved. The 
second includes goals which have been reached or nearly reached by developing 
countries as a group and which a considerable number of relevant countries, about half to 
two thirds or so, have achieved. The third includes goals towards which real progress has 
been made and which perhaps a quarter or a third of relevant countries have reached or 
nearly reached. The fourth category includes goals where little or no progress has been 
made, either in general or by a significant number of countries. An element of judgement 
has been used in applying these categories, especially to give weight to countries where 
the target goal, though not fully achieved, had lead to a substantial improvement in 
performance in relation to the goal.   
 
1) Goals largely achieved 
  
Decolonisation   
- 85 countries became independent since the UN was founded 
Smallpox and polio eradication  
- smallpox eradication achieved in 1977, 11 years after goal adopted; polio 
eradication now expected by 2006, six years after target date. 
Child immunization during 1980s 
- from a baseline of some 20% in 1980, the goal to reach 80 % 3W coverage in 
each of 6 antigens was achieved in some 64 developing and some 26 transition 
countries, with average DPT coverage reaching 73% and measles 74%. (Initially 
                                                 
9 Fuller details and sources are given in the Annexe table.    7
the official statistics of 3W coverage of DPT, polio and measles were suggested 
average was thought to have achieved the 80 % goal).    
Reduction of child deaths from diarrhoea by half and diarrhoea incidence by one quarter 
-WHO estimates that the goal was achieved during 1990s. 
Reducing infant mortality to below 120 by 2000 
-achieved in all but 12 developing countries 
Eradication of guinea worm 
- 88 % decline in cases, now endemic in the poorest villages of only 14 countries 
Earliest possible ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
-all but one country had ratified by the year 2000, within ten years of the summit 
goal being set. (By the same date, CEDAW had been ratified by 168 countries)  
 
2) Goals considerably achieved 
 
Acceleration of economic growth to reach a minimum of  5% by the end of 1960s and to 
average 6% over the 1970s 
During 1960s, 50 countries (comprising about half of total development country 
population) exceeded the 5% goal and developing countries as a group averaged 
5.5 per cent during 1960s; 
During 1970s, growth was much more uneven but developing countries averaged 
5.6 per cent, with 35 countries (comprising about one fifth of developing country 
population) exceeding 6% goal.    
Raising the 3W share of global industrial production to 25% by 2000 
- by year 2000, the 3W share had nearly reached 22%, including transition 
countries the share was over 22%. 
Raising life expectancy to 60 years at a minimum by 2000 
- achieved in 124 of 173 developed and developing countries, with the least 
developed countries and sub-Saharan Africa being the major exceptions. 
Reducing child mortality by a third or to a maximum of 70 by 2000 
- 63 developing countries reduced under-five mortality by the goal of a third or 
more during the 1990s. Over 100 developing countries cut under-five mortality 
rates by more than a fifth over the 1990s.  
Reductions of malnutrition 
-17 per cent decline in proportion of underweight children in 1990s, about half the 
goal of a one-third reduction. Latin America achieved a 60 % decline while SSA 
experienced severe increases. 
Reduction of the proportion of babies born with low birth weight to less than 10% 
In 2000, 57 developing countries had low birth weight below 10%. 
Actions to reduce IDD (Iodine Deficiency Disorders) and Vitamin A Deficiency to tackle 
the hidden hungers of micro nutrient deficiency. By late 1990s, in countries where 
IDD had been a problem, 26 were iodising 90 % of all household salt, 14 over 
75% and a further 14 over 50 per cent. In 78 countries where Vitamin A 
deficiency is a public health problem, 64 have adopted policies since 1990 and by 
1996 half children were receiving Vitamin A capsules compared with one third in 
1994. 
Educational expansion 1960 to 1980     8
- unprecedented progress in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1960s. Primary enrolments 
expanded on average faster than had been projected – but universal access to primary 
education in 1980 was not achieved, in part because population growth was more rapid 
than originally estimated. Secondary and higher education both expanded faster than the 
goals originally set.    
 
3) Goals partly achieved 
 
Access to safe water and sanitation during 1980s 
- access to safe water increased an estimated 130 % and to basic sanitation by 
260%, big increases and faster than in the 1970s and 1990s though of course far 
behind the goal of achieving universal access. 
ODA to reach 0.7 per cent of GNP in each developed country, from 1970 onwards 
-on average, performance has slipped over 30 years since the goal first adopted, 
though 4 countries still exceed it.  The ODA goal is widely used by NGOs to 
press for more developed country support to developing countries, so it is counted 
as a partial achievement. 
ODA for least developed countries to reach 0.15 of GNP in 1980s and 1990s 
- achieved by only 8 out of 16 DAC donor countries in 1980s and by only 5 out of 
20 in 1990s.  
 
4) Goals failed or almost totally failed  
 
Economic growth of 7% or more in 1980s and 1990s 
- Some 15 developing countries achieved this goal in the 1980s and only 7 in the 
1990s. Because China was one of these in both decades, the population of 
countries achieving the goal comprised 30% of total developing country 
population in the 1980s and 27% in the 1990s. But on the whole, economic 
growth in developing countries in these two decades must be counted a failure. 
The 1980s were dubbed the lost decade for development in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and Latin America and the Caribbean.   
Least Developed Countries to double their national income over the 1980s by achieving 
an average growth rate of 7.2 per cent per annum in the 1980s.
10  
-The economic growth rate per capita of the least developed countries 1975 to 
2000 was only 0.3 per cent per annum and from 1990 to 2000 only 1.3 per cent 
per annum. Only 3 least developed countries achieved the growth target in the 
1980s and 1990s.  
Achievement of full employment by 2000 – few developing countries ( and few 
developed ones either) have achieved this goal. 
Reduction of maternal mortality  
  - Only marginal reductions have been achieved 
Halving of illiteracy by 2000 – illiteracy only reduced from 25 % in 1990 to 20% in 2000 
Eradicating malaria – a major failure in 1960, with subsequent resurgence, especially in 
SSA. 
                                                 
10 No quantitative goal was set in the 1991 Least Developed Country Conference of 1991. Instead a more 
general call was made for moving towards sustainable growth and sustainable development.    9
 
Five major conclusions can be drawn from this overview? First, that the vast majority of 
global goals have been largely, considerably or partly achieved. It is a minority of UN 
global goals which have been largely or total failures. Secondly, most of the human 
focused goals have been in the category of largely or considerably achieved, with a better 
record of achievement than the economic goals. Third, achievement of the economic 
goals was considerable in the 1960s and 1970s but has slipped badly in the 1980s and 
1990s. Fourth, the countries which have experienced most failures are clustered in two 
groups of countries – Sub-Saharan African and the least developed countries, two 
categories which overlap.  For this reason, the almost total failure of the goals to 
accelerate growth and development in the least developed countries is particularly 
serious. Fifthly, the goals which relate to the developed donor countries are those which 
are mostly in the partly achieved category (and which for the reasons given might be 
treated as a generous classification). This underlines the importance of developing a new 
and more effective partnerships in the years ahead.      
 
 
3  Approaches to implementation 
 
Once adopted, the goals agreed by the UN have been followed up in very 
different ways. At one extreme, there are goals like those for accelerating economic 
growth during the (First) Development Decade, when the role of the UN has, for the most 
part, been limited to general advocacy and monitoring and reporting back to the 
ECOSOC on performance some years later. Perhaps the goals might have been made a 
focus for technical assistance or more specific advocacy in a few countries but I know of 
no records to confirm this.  
 
At the other extreme, are goals like those for the eradication of smallpox, for the 
expansion of immunization and for broader actions for reducing infant and child 
mortality and improving child health and nutrition.. In the first case, WHO and in the 
second case UNICEF and WHO became actively involved in supporting country by 
country action by – 
1.  advocacy and support in the preparation of national plans of action 
2. providing  technical  support 
3.  providing financial resources, especially for catalytic support and 
4.  monitoring progress regionally and globally, often providing country level  
support for improving the process of national monitoring.   
 
Of course, global goals have by no means been comprehensively or consistently 
implemented. The seriousness with which the different goals have been treated by 
individual governments depends on a number of factors and institutions, namely: 
 
•  The government itself - the extent to which the government judges 
implementation of the goals to be in their interest, which of course, in part reflects 
the nature of the government and the extent to which it is or is not concerned with 
popular support for such activities as poverty reduction and human development.   10
Note however, that the assessment of their self interest as a government is not 
independent of how effectively the costs and benefits of the goals have been 
explained and publicly promoted, internationally as well as nationally, by the 
media and by other groups, including the UN and UN organizations like UNDP, 
UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO, ILO, UNESCO and even FAO. Advocacy behind the 
scenes has often been effective as well as more public advocacy, including at 
times, naming and shaming for failures compared with other countries. 
 
•  NGOs and other groups of civil society, national and international. Major 
international NGOs including Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the 
World Wildlife Fund, OXFAM, Save the Children and Medicins Sans Frontieres 
all have demonstrated capacity and effectiveness to influence as well as to support 
national action towards the adoption and implementation of global goals. Often 
advocacy by NGOs, both international and national, has been more outspoken and 
possibly more effective than advocacy by the international agencies, most clearly 
in relation to HIV/AIDS. 
 
•  UN funds and specialized organisations. In some cases, strong institutional 
support from one or other of the UN agencies has done much to encourage 
governments to take particular goals seriously. These agencies have led the way 
in advocacy and subsequently helped to provide or to mobilize support for 
government action in favour of specific global goals. They have also worked to 
build up support and momentum among other international donors and other 
supporting groups. More generally, UN agencies have played a major role in 
encouraging and supporting the collection of the national data required for 
tracking progress and compiling and publishing the comparative international data 
required for rapid and regular monitoring of global progress.  
 
•  The attitude of World Bank, the IMF and, more recently, the WTO. As already 
explained, the Bretton Woods Institutions have great power to support the pursuit 
of goals with funds and with policy advice, as well as to oppose or undercut 
progress towards the goals, notably by the nature and provisions of adjustment 
programmes. Currently the Bretton Woods Institutions are clearly committed to 
the MDG s. But in previous decades, their disinterest in goals has had serious 
effects on diverting attention and resources from many of the areas and actions 
required for poverty reduction.  
 
There are a number of impressive, even spectacular successes with global goals, for 
which different parts of the UN have played a leading and outstanding role in their 
achievement.  These include: 
 
•  the support of UNICEF and WHO towards the goals of reducing infant and child 
mortality especially by the expansion of immunization to 80 % coverage and the 
expansion of oral rehydration in the 1980s;  
   11
•  the support by UNIFEM and UNFPA for the widespread ratification of CEDAW 
and by UNICEF for the universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child in the 1990s. 
 
And there are lessons to be drawn from some significant failures: 
 
•  the failures of the FAO and WHO to provide active support for countries to 
prepare national plans of action, measures of implementation or even, in the early 
years, for monitoring of the goals set by the International Conference on 
Nutrition, held in Rome in 1992; 
 
•  the failures of the adjustment programmes of the Bretton Woods Institutions to 
restart economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s and to encourage a process of 
human development in the majority of countries in sub-Saharan Africa and the 
countries in transition, in spite of two decades of effort. In this respect, it is 
noteworthy that the World Bank and the IMF have consistently kept their focus 
on means rather than ends – with the goals defined in terms of economic means 
and with the adjustment process assessed mostly in terms of the adoption of 
certain policies rather than in terms of the ends achieved.  
 
4  Defining achievement. What makes for success?  
 
The question of whether of not a global goal has been achieved, or to what extent, raises 
several important issues: was the goal set unrealistically high for all or most or many 
countries (Or of course, too low)? ; Should achievement only be judged in relation to the 
number of countries which by the target date have achieved the goal quantitatively? What 
weight should be given to countries which though failing to reach the goal by the target 
date, have achieved major edvances in relation to the goal, often perhaps by greater 
margins than many countries which achieved the goal? Should progress only be judged in 
relation to quantitative performance or taking account also of other dimensions - 
qualitative aspects, establishing institutional structures to ensure sustainability, etc ? Two 
real examples may help to set the scene. 
 
The International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD: 1981-1990) 
was focused on the goal of universal access to safe water and sanitation by 1990. This 
decade has often been treated as a failure, since virtually no country achieved the goal in 
a precise statistical sense. Even today, apart from a few small islands, hardly any 
developing countries are recorded as having 100% access to water or 100% access to 
sanitation. Nevertheless in the sense that the decade encouraged a major expansion of 
access in many developing countries, the decade must be considered a considerable 
success. More people got access during the decade than ever had access before 1980. 
Over the 1980s, access to water increased by an estimated 1.3 times and to sanitation by 
an estimated 2.6 times, both much higher numbers and higher proportions than in the   12
1970s or the 1990s. In spite of this, the Decade is still too often dismissed as a failure, 
because “the goal was not achieved.”
11 
 
The second example is the goal for Universal Child Immunization (UCI) set by UNICEF 
with WHO support in the mid 1980s. A goal for expanding immunization was originally 
set by the World Health Assembly in 1974, as success in the battle against smallpox 
began to come within sight. (Smallpox was finally eradicated in 1977, an achievement 
formally confirmed three years later). 
 
Immunization was enormously important for improving child health and for reducing 
child mortality and UNICEF from the beginning provided strong support. But in 
September 1982, UNICEF moved from treating the goal as one of a number of desirable 
actions to adopting it as key component of “GOBI”, a set of four priority actions which 
were to be elevated to essential elements in all UNICEF country programmes, as part of 
what UNICEF began to promote as a Child Survival and Development Revolution. The 
four GOBI elements were Growth monitoring and growth promotion of all children, Oral 
rehydration to combat diarrhoea, which in the early 1980s accounted for some 4 to 5 
million under five deaths per year, Breastfeeding and better weaning practices and 
Immunization against the six vaccine preventable diseases, which also accounted for 
some 4 to 5 million deaths each year. In addition there were three additional actions, 
recognized by UNICEF to be more difficult and more expensive:  Family planning and 
birth spacing, Food supplementation and Female education. Together these became 
known as the “GOBI-FFF” programme and all were to be promoted as much as possible 
in as many countries as possible as central priorities in all UNICEF country programmes. 
(At the time, UNICEF had field offices in some 80 developing countries and had 
programmes in some 100).  
 
By 1984-85, immunization rates had doubled or trebled in several countries. Jim Grant, 
UNICEF’s dynamic Executive Director, had the idea of mobilizing on an even greater 
scale. Nyi Nyi, Director of Programmes in UNICEF at the time, summarizes the process,  
 
“So in June 1985, at [Jim Grant’s] urging, the United Nations Secretary General, Javier Perez de 
Cuellar, wrote to the presidents and prime ministers of 159 member states, calling their attention 
to this important drive. A resolution in support of UCI was also passed at the 1985 General 
Assembly, joined by 74 governments and over 400 volunteer organizations.”
12  
  
The goal of UCI was defined as reaching 80% coverage in each individual developing 
country for each of six antigens – against measles, diptheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio and 
tuberculosis – and achieving 80 per cent coverage of these in developing countries as a 
whole.  
 
                                                 
11 I have no quotable source for this, but the point has been made many times to me in my role as Chairman 
of the WSSDD, the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, set up at the end of the Decade to 
coordinated follow up action among the UN agencies, donors and many other professional and non- 
government groups.   
12 This is taken from a detailed, step by step, account by Dr. Nyi Nyi in Jim Grant: UNICEF visionary, 
edited by Richard Jolly, UNICEF, 2001.   13
Defining this goal precisely was not easy. WHO argued that since every child needed to 
be immunized and against all six diseases, the goal should be that 100% of all children 
under 5 would be immunized against all six diseases. UNICEF argued that this was 
unnecessarily strict as well as so impractical as to be doomed to failure. In the first place, 
high levels of immunity in a country would produce herd immunity, thus cutting disease 
even among those not vaccinated. In the second place, since there was no 
interdependence between the vaccines or the diseases, to insist that only children 
vaccinated against all six diseases should be counted, would be to under estimate the 
achievement. There should, therefore, be separate coverage targets for each individual 
vaccine. Eventually, this was agreed to be 80 per cent of all children under 5 adequately 
vaccinated against each of the six diseases by 1990 which meant having received one 
measles vaccination, three each of DPT (diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus) and polio and 
one of BCG against tuberculosis. 
  
By 1990, coverage on average among children in the developing world had – according 
to the best data available at the time - reached 80 to 82% for each of the six antigens and 
some 72 individual countries had achieved the goals. (For Africa, a pragmatic 
redefinition of the goal as 75% coverage had been made in the late 1980s). It was 
estimated that as a result at least three million fewer children were dying each year. By 
1995, total child deaths in developing countries had fallen to 12 million – and by the year 
2000 to just over 10 million, in spite of an increase in the under five population by over a 
third compared with 1980, when some 15 million children were dying.  
 
There is however an important statistical sequel to the 1990 achievement.  After 1990, 
UNICEF gave even more attention to goals, building on the 10 major goals set at the 
World Summit for Children in September 1990.  As part of this, increased attention was 
given to the process of monitoring.  This involved the development of low-cost (multi-
indicator cluster surveys (MICS) to collect sample survey data on a wide range of 
indicators. Eventually MICS were available for some 66 countries with Demographic and 
Health Surveys providing also data for some 35 countries
13.  
 
The development of sample survey data on children for a large number of developing 
countries made it possible to compare the results from different surveys with earlier 
administrative data on immunization coverage.  This in turn led to the belief that in 
general for developing countries several points from a succession of sample surveys 
produced more accurate estimates of level and trend than did administrative data. When 
applied in retrospect to the immunization achievement in 1990, the estimates of coverage 
in that year were reduced from 80 to 82%, to 73% for DPT and 74% for measles.
14 
 
Even allowing for these corrections, UCI involved a three or four-fold increase in 
immunization coverage, compared with 1980, and the IDWSSD more than a doubling for 
                                                 
13 A brief description will be found in UNICEF, “Progress since the World Summit for Children: a 
statistical review”, UNICEF, New York, September, 2001.   
14 Data from UNICEF, “Progress since the World Summit for Children: a statistical review”, UNICEF, 
New York, September, 2001.  This comprehensive report describes the MICS as well as summarizing 
progress over the 1990s for all of the goals agreed at the World Summit for Children.   14
water and something less that a trebling for sanitation. By any standards, these are 
impressive advances – yet the expansion of immunization was treated as an almost total 
success and the expansion of water and sanitation often as an almost total failure. These 
contrasting reactions show the importance of defining goals in ways which combine 
realism with science, good management with public relations
15.  
 
Was immunization “just an easy goal to achieve”? 
  
In part because of its success it is sometimes said that the goal of immunization was 
really rather easy to achieve. Because of this, it is also claimed, the lessons of how the 
expansion of immunization was achieved have little applicability for the process of 
following up the MDGs.  
 
Immunization, by this argument, was relatively easy because it was a top-down process, a 
“one-off action”, relatively cheap, and used a simple, well established technology. In fact, 
all of these are considerable over-simplifications. Though initiation of the goal and its 
adoption country-by-country usually involved top-down advocacy, the process of 
implementation involved a major mobilization a wide variety of national actors – 
churches, women’s groups, Rotary clubs, teachers and local government workers and the 
media as well as the health system and health workers. Without this process of social 
mobilization, the high proportions of parents would never have been stimulated to bring 
their children, for the six occasions required over the first fifteen months of a child’s life. 
In 1990, this involved some 600 million visits of some 100 million children. Moreover, 
this process has continued every year since, with relatively small fluctuations and few 
declines, except in sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
In short, reaching the goal of UCI - universal child immunization- was not simply top-
down, nor was it cheap in terms of widespread human effort or a one-off exercise. Even 
in matters of technology, it was adoption of the goal of UCI which encouraged some of 
the process of simplifying technology, in particular developing better, less sensitive and 
more heat stable vaccines, which would maintain their potency even in situations where 
the cold chain was less than 100 per cent effective. And over the 1990s, immunization 
coverage (according to revised data on DPT) increased in some 58 % of countries (85), 
remained constant in some 7% (10 countries) and decreased in some 35% (51 countries). 
 
Looking at the other MDGs, and past experience, also shows that it is a mistake to treat 
the Immunization success as easy and accelerating progress towards the other goals as 
much more difficult. Achieving the other goals in some respects may be easier, in some 




                                                 
15 The 80 per cent coverage in 1990 (estimated after careful review of all the data in 1991) was at the time 
believed to be a reliable estimate - sufficiently robust for WHO to join UNICEF in publicly certifying the 
achievement of the 80 per cent goals for each of the six antigens.    15
It is important to realize that for the UN and individual UN agencies and organizations, 
success in supporting and meeting the global goals involves much more than efficient 
management in adopting the goals and organizing their own administration to carry them 
out as priorities. This is important but perhaps even more is to promote and mobilize 
national and international support, using the media, the churches, mosques and many 
other institutions of civil society in touch with public opinion and civil organization. 
Once again, Jim Grant in his leadership demonstrated many practical lessons of how this 
could be done, beginning in a few countries, whose examples could then be quoted and 
used to inform and motivate other leaders and countries. 
 
In support of this was a strategy for social mobilization, consciously pursued but little 
known and practiced in other parts of the UN. The key lessons were summarised by Kul 
Gautam, the present deputy executive director of UNICEF, in an article he wrote entitled, 
“Ten Commandments of Jim Grant’s leadership for development.”
16 These were: 
 
1.  Articulate your vision in terms of inspiring goals 
2.  Break down goals into time-bound, doable propositions 
3.  Demystify techniques and technologies 
4. Generate  and  sustain political commitment 
5.  Mobilize a grand alliance of all social forces 
6.  Go to scale 
7. Select  your  priorities and stick to them 
8.  Institute public monitoring and accountability 
9.  Ensure relevance to the broader development agenda 
10. Unleash the full potential of the United Nations system 
 
Each of these could be expanded and has been in the article by Kul Gautam. The essence 
however is to create a process of world-wide mobilization, built around vision and 
inspiration, rather than top down, management by objectives. This is indeed close to one 
recent version of efficient corporate management but for UN leadership, it is almost the 
only system if there is to be global outreach and impact. The UN typically has no 
authority or capacity to issue detailed and specific instructions to governments but, as 
examples show, it can provide leadership and inspiration in a process of worldwide 
political and social mobilization. And the point of social mobilization is to emphasise that 
the process can go far beyond governments to mobilize civil society within countries as 
well as internationally, even in situations where the government itself is reluctant or even 
unwilling. This is particularly important for some actions in relation to human rights but 
it has been shown to have powerful potential in mobilizing action towards some of the 
goals for women, for children, and in such areas as health, education, HIV/AIDS and 
family planning. In all these areas, the ten commandments of Jim Grant have particular 
relevance.  
 
These examples show the importance of an individual UN agency making support for the 
achievement of a specific goal an explicit and high profile corporate objective. There are 
                                                 
16 This will also be found in Jim Grant: UNICEF visionary, edited by Richard Jolly, UNICEF, 2001. 
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many ways this can be done and it can involve many forms of support. But among the 
most important, seem to be:  
 
•  making support for an individual global goal (or several goals) a clear priority 
both of headquarters and of every field office and staff member, with recognized 
and defined implications for priorities in the allocation of staff time within the 
agency and of the allocation of its country level as well as international budgets; 
 
•  ensuring that all staff, (not only professionals, national and international but also, 
for instance, secretarial staff and drivers), are aware of the goals, are prepared to 
promote awareness of them in all aspects of their daily work and are conscious 
that this is one of the daily responsibilities; 
 
•  Serving as a mobilizer of donor funding and support and itself as a funder of last 
resort, both when donor interest for particular countries may be lacking and in the 
event of urgent financial needs when other support may not be available in time, 
if progress towards the goals is to be kept on track; 
 
•  ensuring support for national efforts of statistical monitoring, linked to regional 
and international systems for compiling and publicising the results; 
 
•  Using the “bully pulpit” of the agency and its senior staff, nationally as well as 
internationally, to promote awareness of the goals and to enlist support from 
political and opinion leaders. 
 
 
5  Costs of action towards achieving the goals 
 
This is an area where experience shows many mistakes have been made, especially in 
estimating the additional costs to meeting new goals. In the case of the goals for 
immunization, one early estimate was that it would cost about an additional $1200 
million a year by 1990. In the event, UNICEF in that year spent $150 million. In the 
Board of UNICEF, cynics warned that this sum, about 15 per cent of UNICEF’s annual 
expenditure, would have to be maintained forever, if the levels of immunization achieved 
in developing countries were not to fall. By 1995, UNICEF programme expenditure on 
immunization had fallen to $79 million, while coverage in developing countries had been 
increased or maintained in almost two thirds of developing countries. 
 
Of course, the total cost of achieving a goal is far beyond the cost to an individual agency 
of the UN or even or all UN agencies taken together. No doubt there is value in trying to 
make an estimate of the total cost – ideally, of course, of the total opportunity cost. But 
here begin the problems. 
 
 In the first place, the opportunity cost for any individual country is, strictly speaking, 
defined as the cost of the resources used for the achievement of the goal evaluated against   17
their next best alternative use. The whole point of adopting many of the goals is to shift 
expenditure away from second or third best priorities.  
 
Second, there has often been a tendency in international agencies, and particularly in the 
World Bank, to make cost estimates based on their own project experience, much of 
which has involved inflated costs, or stand alone projects costs, far beyond those which 
the government itself, let alone local NGOs or local communities, would need to pay for 
effective implementation of the goal concerned.  
 
Third, implementing the goals concerned often involves a focused, marginal addition to 
the costs of some service already being provided – adding immunization to a health 
structure already in place, increasing enrolments of girls in schools already built, 
sometimes in rural areas where teachers have small classes. Of course, such arguments 
can be overdone – but the point is that marginal costs of expanding to achieve a goal are 
often much less than average costs. (Though it must be recognized that the marginal costs 
of pushing to the last five or ten per cent of coverage, may often involve reaching out to 
more distant or otherwise disadvantaged communities, where marginal costs may be 
rising.) 
  
Fourth, and most significant of all, the calculations of fully achieving a goal may 
reasonably be based on the assumption that all eligible countries will embark on the 
process. But experience shows that for one reason or another, many will not. To make the 
decision to adopt a goal, or the international strategy to support it, dependent on the 
assumption of 100% compliance, almost always involves a considerable over-estimate.  
 
All the above relates to the technical process of calculating the likely cost, to 
governments, to the international agencies or, in some sense, to the global community as 
a whole, of achieving the goal. There are two other dimensions, often involved. First is 
the process of bargaining and international negotiation. Often the contribution of the 
donor countries towards goal achievement has got caught in a confrontational process of 
developing countries pressing for high levels of international financial support, the 
donors for the opposite. Often, reference to the need to move to the 0.7 per cent target for 
international aid flows is incorporated in the resolution. The result is that whatever the 
technical calculations, the pressures for pushing up or pushing down the estimates gets 
caught in a process of international bargaining, bearing little relation to the estimated 
costs of the action concerned. 
 
The second relates to the bias of economists to estimate costs in terms of opportunity 
costs, with little attention to the wider realities of the situation, let alone to the public 
relations impact of such estimates. In the case of an immunization effort by UNICEF in 
Turkey in the mid 1980s, about three quarters of the estimated cost of an immunization 
campaign was the estimated opportunity cost of the free contribution of television 
advertising towards the process of national mobilization. The estimated cost per child 
immunization appeared high – but essentially reflected these estimated costs of 
television, which might otherwise have been promoting consumer goods of little social 
value.   18
 
6 The pros and cons of setting global goals 
 
The pursuit of global goals has not been without controversy. The focus on global goals 
has been criticised by academics and development practitioners on several counts, for
17: 
 
•  leading to a top down process of planning and implementation, at the cost 
of bottom up participation in which the community or other local groups 
set their own priorities for development.  
•  biasing the selection of development goals in favour of those which are 
internationally favoured by experts of donors, as opposed to those which 
make most sense in the particular context of individual countries. 
•  leading to such a pre-occupation with quantitative achievement that other 
dimensions of the issues get neglected, such as the quality of schooling or 
the broader issues of primary health care and nutrition. 
•  causing local or national officials to falsify the statistics, rather than to 
admit failures or the non-availability of relevant data 
•  encouraging excessive optimism and thereby causing discouragement, 
despair and cynicism, when global goals are not achieved.     
 
No doubt, at times, some of these criticisms have been justified.  But rather than take 
them as arguments against goals, they are better treated as important concerns to be taken 
into account when setting goals or working on their implementation.  To adopt the 
position that all global goals must be rejected is to throw out the possibility of co-
ordinated global action.  Better is to frame global goals in ways that maximize global 
benefits and minimize the costs. 
 
The need to plan for both partial success and partial failure. 
 
This is an important lesson of UN experience with goals. There is both a need to avoid 
giving hostages to fortune by encouraging exaggerated expectations just as there is a need 
to avoid starting with so much caution as to fuel exactly the initial sense of pessimism 
and discouragement that can become a self fulfilling prophesy and lead to failure. This 
important but delicate balance needs to be carefully thought through at the early stages. 
What is the most likely outcome in the different dimensions of goal achievement and 
failure, what is probably the most that can be expected and what is likely to be the least? 
How can these possibilities be presented in the early stages, so as to encourage real effort 
and commitment, worthy of being treated as real success, without slipping into 
exaggerated expectations? 
 
                                                 
17 Most of a whole issue of the SCN news on nutrition was devoted to the assessing the risks and 
disadvantages of setting global goals – perhaps somewhat ironically, in view of the successful experience 
of global goals for nutrition, for instance in mobilizing global action towards the reduction of Vitamin A 
and Iodine deficiency. See  UN System’s Forum on Nutrition, SCN News 22 Nutrition Goals and Targets, 
July, 2001, WHO, Geneva, 2001   19
There are already reasons for concern with the MDGs. By expressing the goals in terms 
of halving the proportion of those in income poverty by 2015 and halving or reducing by 
an even larger proportion those failing to achieve some other goals, the poorest and most 
deprived countries face the biggest challenge. If economic performance in these countries 
continues as weak and often negative as it has been in the last two decades, failure to 
achieve most of the goals becomes very likely. What will be the likely outcome in terms 
of further support for the goals and for the UN process behind it? 
 
Here one must already be worried. Donors and the Bretton Woods institutions over the 
last few years have stressed national ownership, notably with the PRSPs which 
themselves are to be directly focused on the MDGs. This is desirable and long overdue. 
But, as anyone close to the process knows, the end result is still enormously given by 
what is judged by the IMF and the Bank to be acceptable. More worrying still, success in 
implementation will be enormously influenced by external changes – prices of the 
countries major exports, receipts of aid and debt relief and, for some countries, inflows of 
private investment, not merely in quantity but to the time-schedule as planned – and by 
unforeseeable domestic changes, such as floods or droughts, declines in commodity 
prices, political upsets, and terrorist attacks. Already the threat of war and terrorist attacks 
in countries far away has had devastating effects on tourism in some parts of the world 
and the price of oil has been rising. All these disruptions affect progress and the 
possibilities of towards the goals in a number of countries. If and when such disruptions 
and set backs occur in the future, how will public support and Parliamentary support in 
the industrial countries be affected? Unless the ground is well presented in the early 
stages, there could be a dangerous backlash, not merely against the goals but against aid 
and the UN effort more generally. 
 
To prepare the ground, it is important now to plan for partial success and for partial 
failure, not for the extremes of either total success or total failure.  What would this 
involve? 
 
Planning for Partial success would involve shifting the emphasis in mobilisation, 
presentation and monitoring to: 
 
•  The number of countries individually achieving the goals or being on track, with 
the totals presented by region as well as by percentage of the world population 
covered. These measures have already been presented in the HDR 2002 and 
should be continued.  
•  In addition, the number of countries showing some acceleration over past trends 
should be presented, even if they are not yet on track to achieve the goals. With 
respect to some goals like the reduction of MMR, for which so little progress has 
been made over recent decades, even some reduction needs to be treated as a 
considerable and welcome advance. 
•  Progress by regions needs to be presented, not only in absolutes but also relative 
to other countries in the region. Given the extreme difficulties being faced by 
many of the least developed countries in and beyond Sub-Saharan Africa, 
acceleration in progress towards the goals may often represent much greater and   20
more committed effort than equivalent statistical progress in richer and better off 
countries. 
  
Partial failure must also be monitored, but on the international agency and donor side as 
well on the side of developing countries. This will require: 
 
•  Monitoring partnership. This will require monitoring and analysing indicators 
of agency and donor performance, covering not only total financial flows but 
also such items as speed and adequacy of debt relief, speed and fulfilment of 
aid commitments, etc. changes in export prices as well as export volumes and 
thus net availability of foreign exchange resources. 
•  Some naming and shaming of the worst developing country performers has a 
place, as it has had in the area of human rights. But double standards must be 
avoided. The process needs to be seen to be fair, not biased to the enemies of 
the major donors, nor too sparing of donor failures and inadequacies, 
especially when the latter are linked to failures of countries to achieve the 
goals.  
•  More analysis of the causes of country success and country failure, with 
attention to the common factors among countries succeeding and failing.  
 
7 Conclusions and questions remaining. 
 
The process of setting global goals in the UN and the process and experience of follow up 
has been more serious and more successful than often realized. But any assessment of 
success and achievement needs to take account of the wide diversity of goals which have 
been set over the years and the different ways in which different parts of the UN have 
been involved in follow up, support and monitoring.  The positive examples need to be 
considered as well as the negative examples where the goals seem to have had little 
effect.  
 
It is important to develop a more nuanced definition of the meaning of success in goal 
achievement. At least six specific aspects need to be incorporated: 
 
1.  The need for several degrees and dimensions of achievement, not just one. 
2.  At the least, these should include the number of individual countries achieving the 
goals within each region and the proportion of the population of developing 
countries involved. HDR 2002 has established a good model in this regard. 
3.  In addition, the extent of advance toward each goal should be measured in all 
countries, with totals given for each region and for the developing world as a 
whole, also weighted by the total population to which the goal refers 
4.  Particular attention needs to be given to progress in the poorer countries and those 
starting from low levels of achievement. Expressing goals in terms of halving the 
distance between present levels and universal achievement by a fixed target date 
usually means that countries starting from further behind face a bigger challenge. 
This could be modified by extending the target date or modifying the goal. Even 
without this, progress could be measured by giving more attention to percentage   21
advance in relation to the starting point and comparing rates of advance among 
countries with broadly the same starting point.    
5.  Such a multi-dimensional frame should also be used for analysing causes for 
success and failure and for drawing lessons for the future. 
6.  In setting global goals in the future, the impact of the way the goals are framed, 
defined and measured should be carefully thought through in advance, in terms of 
what are the real and the desirable objectives and what are the likely effects on 
public opinion of the way the goals are framed and promoted.    
 
In the case of the MDG s for 2015, where the goals have already been set, it is not too 
late to elaborate the way progress and achievement will be measured and assessed taking 
account of the first four points above. Particular attention should be paid to the media, 
with efforts from the beginning to present a more nuanced approach to monitoring and 
assessment of progress. In the eventual assessment of achievement, one needs to make 
assessments in relation to each specific global goal and to avoid superficial all or nothing 
conclusions.  
 
The UN over four decades has taken the lead in setting a diversity of goals and has had 
considerable success in influencing country action and achievement, especially in those 
areas most closely related to human development. This point deserves to be strongly 
emphasised in HDR 2003. 
 
In contrast, until recently the World Bank and the IMF have generally opposed medium 
to long term goals in the sense of time bound quantitative targets. Ironically, at country 
level in the economic sphere they have often insisted on the adoption of a considerable 
number of economic targets and used them for monitoring national performance in 
implementing adjustment programmes. Unfortunately, such targets have generally been 
economic ones, focused on the economic means to recovery, rather than indicators of 
human or more general development advance.  
 
The implications of this past experience for future UN-BW interaction and 
country support also needs to be carefully considered. Pursuit of the Millennium 
Development Goals could well be undermined in the future, as it has been in the past, if 
the there is no change in adjustment policies and if the goal of poverty reduction is 
treated entirely as a matter of reducing income poverty, which in turn is almost entirely a 
function of accelerating economic growth rates and not changing the pattern and 
composition of economic growth.  
 
The way the international economic and political context of each country constrains or 
supports progress towards the goals and long run goal achievement needs to be given 
more systematic attention and analysis. At present, the debate over whether economic 
growth is or is not an essential condition for reducing poverty (and achieving the other 
MDG s) hides many complex interactions. The debate often focuses on a narrow range of 
macro measures of economic growth and neglects the diversity of ways in which policies 
and actions towards different types of goals are affected by broader economic and   22
political issues in each country, as well as changes in the international context in which 
they are set and by which they are influenced.   
   
        January 4th 2003 
 
  